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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, America’s signals 
intelligence community began growing exponentially in scope and 
power.  In the forefront of this community was the National Security 
Agency (“NSA”), acting with the aid of the USA PATRIOT Act.1  
Between 2001 and 2013, the scope of the NSA’s surveillance programs 
grew to include not only foreign communications, but also the mass 
collection of domestic metadata, including information on routing, 
senders, and recipients of phone calls, texts, and emails.2 
The extent of domestic surveillance has come to light primarily 
through leaks of classified documents and specifically, those occurring in 
May 2013, by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden.3  The NSA is 
now facing unprecedented challenges to the legality of these programs 
from private citizens bringing Fourth Amendment actions, technology 
companies demanding more transparency about the demands being 
placed on them by Foreign Intelligence Service Court (“FISC”) orders, 
and now Congress introducing bipartisan legislation to counteract the 
PATRIOT Act’s provisions and the domestic surveillance that the NSA 
conducts.4 
This Article will discuss the historical post-9/11 timeline relative to 
the domestic surveillance program.  It addresses the underlying historical 
and constitutional concept of the Fourth Amendment, Third Party 
Doctrine, which the federal government is relying upon to justify the 
legality of mass domestic surveillance, as well as to defend legal 
challenges to the programs.  This Article will provide an analysis of 
legislative proposals addressing NSA surveillance overreach, including 
the USA FREEDOM Act and its subsequent manager’s amendment, 
 
1 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 20–22, 28, 31, 42, 47, 49–50 U.S.C.). 
2 The NSA utilized contact chaining as a process of “building a network graph that 
models the communication . . . patte[rn]s of targeted entities . . . and their associates from 
the communication sent or received by the targets.” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ST-
09-0002, 13 (Mar. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-inspector-general-report-
document-data-collection [hereinafter OIG Report]. 
3 Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files—Timeline, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 
21, 2013, 5:54PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-
files-timeline. 
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, 
Dragnet-collection, and Online Monitoring Act, H.R. 3361, S. 1599, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013) 
[hereinafter FREEDOM Act]. 
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address their strengths and weaknesses, and discuss potential courses of 
legislative and judicial action to address these issues.5  Part II of this 
Article addresses the timeline by which the NSA’s surveillance programs 
were developed; Part III addresses the Third Party Doctrine under the 
Fourth Amendment; Part IV discusses legal challenges to the NSA 
surveillance programs before and after the Snowden leaks; Part V 
analyzes legislation proposed during the 113th Congress that addresses 
domestic NSA surveillance; Part VI looks at the strengths and weakness 
of the proposed legislation; Part VII reviews presidential action on the 
surveillance reforms; and Part VIII concludes this Article by discussing 
further judicial and legislative actions to address domestic surveillance 
concerns and the need to maintain a balance between privacy and security 
as technology advances. 
 
II. 9/11 TO TODAY—THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NSA’S 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the NSA took the first steps 
toward developing mass surveillance infrastructure as we know it today.  
First, on September 14, 2001, NSA Director General Michael Hayden 
approved targeted surveillance of specific, preapproved telephone 
numbers generating communications between the United States and 
foreign countries with known terrorist activities.6  The congressional 
intelligence committees were made aware of these targeted collections 
shortly thereafter, and by October 4, 2001, authority had been granted to 
collect content data for such calls and emails.7 
The NSA initially pushed back at Vice President Dick Cheney’s 
Office’s suggestion that Executive Order (“EO”) 12333 permitted the 
data collection program to apply toward intercepting domestic 
communications.8  Regardless, the program began expanding when 
 
5 Id. 
6 See OIG Report, supra note 2, at 3 (asserting that by September 26, 2001, the NSA 
anticipated collecting all telephonic metadata between the U.S. and Afghanistan). 
7 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 7. 
8 Exec. Order No. 12,333, Part 2.3, 3 C.F.R. 1981 (1981) (stating “Collection of 
Information. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain or 
disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with 
procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney 
General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order . . . of the following 
types of information; (c) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, 
counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation; (d) 
Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations, including those who 
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Attorney General John Ashcroft signed off on its implementation per EO 
12333 and the NSA General Counsel declared the program legal on 
October 5, 2001.9 
By late 2002, the NSA was reaching out to telecommunication 
companies (“telecoms”) to gain assistance with the surveillance program 
and in early 2003, installed a system at one of AT&T’s San Francisco 
locations to collect and analyze communications data.10  The NSA also 
reached voluntary agreements with three unidentified companies to share 
information under the program’s authority, allowing it to gain access to 
eighty-one percent of all international telephone calls.11  Formal letters 
requested information regarding communications traffic that may 
terminate in the United States, aggregated call record information, and 
computer-to-computer data.12 
By 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) became involved to improve collaborative 
analytics.13  Despite some pushback from the telecoms, the data collection 
continued.14  In 2004, Attorney General Ashcroft forwarded letters 
necessitating continued cooperation, stating that the law for data 
collection required no warrant or court order.15  In July 2004, the FISC 
began issuing orders permitting the collection of metadata under the 
program pursuant to pen register (“PR”) and trap and trace (“TT”) 
 
are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations; . . . (i) Incidentally 
obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, 
state, local or foreign laws . . . .”). 
9 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Timeline of NSA Domestic Spying, 
https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/timeline (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) (citing ERIC LICHTBLAU, 
BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (First Anchor Books 2009) (stating White 
House associates “shoved” the order in front of Ashcroft and “told him to sign it.”)); see OIG 
Report, supra note 2, at 9, 11 (conveying that on October 11, 2001, the NSA GC for 
Operations and Deputy GC were read in and agreed to the program’s legality). 
10 Decl. of Mark Klein, 3:5-26, Mar. 28, 2006, Jewel v. NSA, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/document/unredacted-klein-declaration. 
11 See OIG Report, supra note 2, at 27, 29–30. 
12 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 31. 
13 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
14 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 30 (showing that three companies declined to support the 
NSA’s surveillance efforts for various reasons, including corporate liability concerns and a 
request to obtain an opinion from outside counsel). 
15 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 32.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) (2012), 
providing that no warrant or court order is required if authorization is provided by the AG, 
Deputy AG, Associate AG or other principal prosecuting attorney who reasonably believes 
that an emergency situation exists that involves conspiratorial activities threatening the 
national security interest.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a)(ii) (2012). 
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authority, and now renews the orders quarterly.16  The domestic 
surveillance program’s capture of purely domestic communications and 
the NSA’s backdoor access to telecoms was revealed in 2005.17 
On May 24, 2006, the FISC first executed an order utilizing business 
records as a basis for continued dragnet collection of telephone metadata 
as it had under prior executive authority, and continues to renew the order 
every ninety days.18  Additionally, the order expanded the definition of 
“facility” to include gateways or cable heads through which mass 
communications are directed.19  In August 2007, President Bush signed 
into law the Protect America Act, which gave the NSA the power to 
collect information if it “reasonably believed” that the surveillance target 
is overseas.20  In 2008, President Bush also signed into law the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) Amendments Act, which gave 
retroactive immunity to telecoms that cooperated with NSA surveillance 
programs and provided greater authority to Attorney General Ashcroft 
and the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) to conduct surveillance 
on citizens.21  The collection of Internet metadata continues as domestic 
communications are collected “in the course of monitoring foreign 
 
16 Before 2006, only the presiding Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) 
judge, Royce Lamberth and his successor, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, were briefed on the 
program.  OIG Report, supra note 2, at 25, 41.  A pen register is a mechanical device that 
records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when 
the dial on the telephone is released.  It does not overhear oral communications and does not 
indicate whether calls are actually completed."  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736, n. 1 
(1979) (citing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 169, 169 (1977)).  A “trap and trace” 
device is a “device or process that records the sources of incoming signals to a specific phone 
or computer.  Often used by law enforcement as the advanced counterpart of Caller ID.  A 
trap and trace device identifies the phone numbers or Internet addresses of incoming signals, 
but does not include substantive information transmitted by those signals.”  See Legal 
Information Institute, Trap and Trace Device, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trap_and_trace_device (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
17 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; James 
Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/politics/21nsa.html. 
18 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 40. 
19 OIG Report, supra note 2, at 41. 
20 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–55, 121 Stat. 552 (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1803, 1805, 1885 (2012)); see James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen 
Reach for Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A1. 
21 See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–261, §§ 702–703, 122 Stat. 2436, 
2437–38 (2008) (codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2012)); see also Eric Lichtblau, Senate 
Approves Bill to Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at A1. 
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targets,” with approximately 500 billion communication records 
intercepted and analyzed in 2012, via a program called “One-End 
Foreign,” which relies on the FISA Amendments Act for its legality; this 
is the same year that President Obama reauthorized the FISA 
Amendments Act.22 
Likewise, it was revealed that the NSA’s surveillance programs 
expanded to include the collection of all domestic telephone calls as 
reflected in a July 13, 2013 FISC order requiring that Verizon disclose all 
“telephony metadata” transiting through its network on a daily basis, 
pursuant to 50 U.S. § 1861.23  Similarly, a report shows that the 
government used the PRISM program to collect Internet data from United 
States service providers Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, AOL, 
Skype, YouTube, and Apple and used corporate partnerships to overcome 
barriers to such collection.24  Also, the MUSCULAR program tapped 
Yahoo and Google’s cloud computing network, based overseas, to 
intercept entire email archives and years worth of messages and to “take 
a retrospective look at target activity,” which can include wholly 
domestic communications that are simply stored out of the country.25 
Finally, recently raised concerns include the NSA working with the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) in placing 
invidious backdoors into commercial Internet encryption algorithms to 
allow unfettered governmental access to virtually all information moving 
through cyberspace.26  A top secret budget document referring to the 
 
22 Pub. L. No. 112–238, 126 Stat. 1631 (2012) (codified as 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885 
(2012)); Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA is Still Harvesting Your 
Online Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection. 
23 In re the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible 
Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs. ex rel MCI Commc’n Servs., Inc., No. BR 13-80 
(FISA Ct. 2013) (requiring Verizon to disclose “telephony metadata” pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 
1861), available at https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf. 
24 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. 
Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html. 
25 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data 
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-
google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-
8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
26 Jeff Larson, Nicole Perlroth, & Scott Shane, Revealed: The NSA’s Secret Campaign to 
Crack, Undermine Internet Security, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 5, 2013, 2:08 PM), 
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SIGINT (signals intelligence) Enabling Project gives this credence, as it 
reflects a $250 million annual layout toward goals of inserting 
vulnerabilities in commercial encryption systems, influencing policies, 
standards and specifications for commercial public key technologies, and 
collecting data or metadata from cooperative networks or increased 
control over networks.27 
 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE AND MASS 
DATA COLLECTION 
There is little doubt that the collection of content data, absent 
probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable 
search.28  However, whether the mass collection of domestic metadata 
violates the Fourth Amendment is a question that is still being wrestled 
with due to the historical approval of the Third Party Doctrine (“TPD”) 
arising from the seminal opinion of Smith v. Maryland.29 
In Smith, a PR was used to assist in a conviction of a burglary.30  The 
Supreme Court held that using a PR did not constitute an unreasonable 
search because individuals are aware that phone companies maintain 
permanent records of dialed phone numbers, thereby abrogating any 
expectation of privacy.31  As Smith has not been overruled, it maintains 
its standing as a guiding principle under stare decisis and is being 
utilized, at least in part, as a basis for conducting domestic surveillance 
as discussed below. 
The FISC cites directly to the Smith reasoning, in a heavily redacted 
 
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-
encryption (explaining that the NIST creates and standardizes Internet encryption algorithms 
and codes for widespread use in commercial telecommunication and e-communication 
products). 
27 SIGINT Enabling Project, Top Secret//SI/TK//NOFORN, 115–17, PROPUBLICA, 
available at http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/784285-sigint-enabling-
project.html. 
28 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Over the last decade, 
email has become ‘so pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be [an] essential means 
or necessary instrument[ ] for self-expression, even self-identification.’  It follows that email 
requires strong protection under the Fourth Amendment; otherwise, the Fourth Amendment 
would prove an ineffective guardian of private communication, an essential purpose it has 
long been recognized to serve.”) (citations omitted). 
29 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
30 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012) (defining pen register as a device that records dialing, 
routing, addressing, or signaling information by an instrument or facility from which a wire 
or electronic communication is transmitted); Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
31 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–45 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)). 
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opinion/order, in noting that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the collection of metadata.32  The FISC notes that Congress relaxed 
requirements to collect “non-content addressing information through 
[PR] and [TT] devices” through the PATRIOT Act and FISA 
Amendments and that “such information is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.”33  Like phone calls under Smith, the FISC held that email 
users, due to the same reasoning, also do not have an expectation of 
privacy.34  The FISC recognized the need for only a relevance standard, 
rather than reasonable suspicion, in approving the government’s requests 
for widespread surveillance.35 
The FISC analogizes the low hit rate in obtaining actionable 
information through dragnet metadata collection to DUI checkpoints and 
drug testing students in justifying suspicionless searches.36  Further, great 
deference must be given to the government officials who have a unique 
understanding of these situations, and they do not need to act in the least 
intrusive means available.37  In so approving of the bulk collection of 
metadata, the court provided: 
analogous to suspicionless searches and seizures that have upheld 
under the Fourth Amendment in that the Government’s need is 
compelling and immediate, the intrusion on individual privacy 
interests is limited, and bulk collection appears to be a reasonably 
effective means of monitoring (redacted) related operatives . . . .  In 
these circumstances, the certification of relevance is consistent with 
the fact that only a very small proportion of the huge volume of 
information collected will be directly relevant to the FBI’s (redacted) 
 
32 Case Name and Number Redacted, at 58–59 (FISA Ct. Date Redacted) (executed by 
FISC Presiding Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf [hereinafter FISC 
Opinion]. 
33 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2012) (defining a “trap and trace device” as a device that captures 
incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other 
information that identifies the source of a wire or electronic communication); FISC Opinion, 
supra note 32, at 19. 
34 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 19. 
35 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 29 (citing 147 CONG. REC. S10990,11003 (daily ed. 
Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[T]he FBI ‘made a clear case that a relevance 
standard is appropriate for counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations.’”)). 
36 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 50–52 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2008) (discussing drug testing students)); Mich. Dep’t. of State Police 
v. Sitz. 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (discussing DUI checkpoints). 
37 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 53. 
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investigations.38 
 
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE AND 
JUDICIAL PUSHBACK ON THE THIRD  PARTY DOCTRINE 
A.   Pre-Snowden Leak Cases 
Several challenges to the NSA’s domestic surveillance programs 
have been made against both the government and private entities working 
with the government.  These include Hepting v. AT&T,39 Jewel v. NSA,40 
and Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush,41 all of which sought 
redress for Fourth Amendment violations under the NSA’s surveillance 
programs.  In Hepting, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) 
sought to preclude AT&T from routing copies of Internet traffic directly 
to the NSA.42  In Jewel, numerous individuals brought actions against the 
NSA to cease the ongoing dragnet collection of metadata.43  In Al-
Haramain, plaintiffs, a now defunct Islamic organization, sued the Bush 
administration for alleged warrantless wiretapping of the Foundation, 
which they asserted violated FISA.44 
In all three cases, the government moved to dismiss the actions by 
asserting that the State Secrets Privilege preempted litigation.45  In what 
 
38 FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 54. 
39 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006), cert. denied, Ctr. for 
Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 13 S. Ct. 1497 (2014). 
40 Jewel v. NSA, No. C 08-cv-4373 VRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5110 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
10, 2010), cert. denied, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 13 S. Ct. 1497 (2014). 
41 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush (In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig.), 
633 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2009), cert. denied, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 
13 S. Ct. 1497 (2014); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. 
Or. 2006), cert. denied, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 13 S. Ct. 1497 (2014). 
42 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see also In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 
F. Supp. 2d 892 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing the efforts of state officials to compel 
telecommunication carriers to release information regarding the disclosure of 
telecommunication records to the NSA). 
43 See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see also In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 
633 F. Supp. 2d 892 (discussing the efforts of state officials to compel telecommunication 
carriers to release information regarding the disclosure of telecommunication records to the 
NSA); Complaint for Jewel, Jewel v. NSA, No. C 08-cv-4373 VRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5110 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2010); see also, Electronic Frontier Found., Jewel v. NSA, 
https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
44 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949; Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 
Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215. 
45 Doc. No. 308 at 3, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. C-06-672-VRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 41160 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (explaining that the United States Government sought 
dismissal or summary judgment based on the state secrets privilege in May 2006); see 
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turned out to be a pyrrhic victory, the courts rejected the State Secrets 
Privilege argument as abrogated by 50 U.S.C. § 1806.46  However, none 
of the plaintiffs have yet been successful in having their cases decided on 
the merits.47  The district court dismissed Hepting because of the FISA 
Amendments of 2008 that granted retroactive immunity to telecoms, and 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal.48  The district court dismissed 
Jewel on the statutory claims for damages under FISA and for injunctive 
relief on sovereign immunity grounds, although the Fourth Amendment 
question may yet survive.49  In Al-Haramain, the district court granted a 
summary judgment award of $2.5 million in damages.  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed and dismissed that judgment, holding that the government did 
not waive sovereign immunity and that to be individually liable under 50 
U.S.C. § 1810, the governmental official subject to the claim must also 
be subject to criminal prosecution.50 
In the most high profile case, Clapper v. Amnesty International 
 
Government Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 18, Jewel 
v. NSA, No. C:08-cv-4373-VRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5110  (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2010); 
see also Kurt Opshal, Breaking News: Court Holds That FISA Preempts State Secret 
Privilege, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 2, 2008), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/07/court-rules-fisa-preempts-state-secret-privilege 
(explaining the Northern District of California held that the FISA Act preempted the State 
Secrets Privilege in Al Haramain v. Bush).  The State Secrets Privilege is one that must be 
formally asserted by the head of the department with control over the matter, and the Court 
must do without forcing the disclosure of the privileged information.  The government may 
not be required to divulge the information for an in camera inspection by the court if the judge 
finds, based on “all the evidence and circumstances” that there is a reasonable danger that 
such disclosure would “expose military matters, which in the interest of national security, 
should not be divulged.”  United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953). 
46 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2012) provides that if the disclosure of documents subject to a 
legal challenge would harm national security, same may be reviewed ex parte and in camera 
by the court; see also, Jewel v. NSA, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Hepting, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41160, at *10; Opshal, supra note 45 (referencing the Northern 
District of California’s ruling that the FISA Act preempted the State Secrets Privilege in Al-
Haramain v. Bush). 
47 Jewel, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1097; Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 
845, 855 (9th Cir. 2012); NSA Telecomms. Records Litig. v. AT&T Corp., 671 F.3d 881 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
48 NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881, cert denied, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 
133 S. Ct. 421 (2012). 
49 Jewel, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1097. 
50 “An aggrieved person . . . who has been subjected to an electronic surveillance . . . in 
violation of [50 U.S.C. § 1809] shall have a cause of action against any person who committed 
such violation . . . .”  50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2012); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 705 F.3d 
at 855. 
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USA,51 a number of international groups sought to have Section 702 of the 
FISA Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a), declared facially 
unconstitutional as violating the Fourth Amendment by asserting that 
surveillance on their international activities compromised their ability to 
“locate witnesses, cultivate sources, obtain information, and 
communicate confidential information to their clients.”52  The Supreme 
Court did not address the Fourth Amendment claims, but did hold that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing as they could not prove injury in fact 
because neither speculation of surveillance nor taking action to avoid 
surveillance constitutes injury to warrant standing.53 
 
B.   Post-Snowden Leak Challenges and Recent Developments 
Despite the above, the Supreme Court indicated a potential 
willingness to address whether various methods of electronic surveillance 
violated the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Jones, a case 
involving the placement of a GPS tracker on a suspect’s vehicle.54  In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor suggested a need to revisit the 
TPD in the digital age in the concurring opinion and noted that electronic 
monitoring of individuals can chill associational and expressive freedoms 
and that the government’s unfettered access to substantial intimate 
information “may alter the relationship between citizen and government 
that is inimical to democratic society.”55  Further, it may be “necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” as that 
expectation is ill suited to the digital age due to the massive amounts of 
information disclosed “in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”56  
Information disclosed to a third party for a limited purpose should not be 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protections simply because as it stands, 
secrecy is a prerequisite for privacy.57 
It is increasingly obvious that the court’s reliance upon the concept 
that data is voluntarily disseminated is misplaced because of the reality 
 
51 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
52 Id. at 1145; see 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2012). 
53 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150–51. 
54 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
55 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 
272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
56 Id. at 957. 
57 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”)). 
OMBRES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/22/2015  10:30 AM 
38 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
that post-modern usage of the Internet is to conduct one’s necessary daily 
activities, fostering arguments toward the fundamental right of access to 
the Internet.58  There is no longer a dichotomy between voluntary and 
involuntary relinquishment of electronic information due to the ubiquity 
of e-communication, rendering untenable any construction of the Fourth 
Amendment that makes unreasonable the expectation of privacy through 
such communication.59  The Court recognized this distinction in City of 
Ontario v. Quon,60 holding: 
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information 
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what 
society accepts as proper behavior . . . .  Cell phone and text message 
communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider 
them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-
expression, even self-identification.  That might strengthen the case 
for an expectation of privacy.61 
The Court seems to note that just because the way of life is changing 
does not result in the loss of fundamental liberties, and as interactions 
with third parties are fundamental to life in a technological era, invocation 
of the TPD should be limited.62  This apparent trend of the Court toward 
a more limited interpretation of the Fourth Amendment via technological 
developments is, to a degree, corroborated by their recent holding in Riley 
v. California, prohibiting the police from accessing the digital data stored 
in a defendant’s cellular phone incident to arrest.63  The Court declined to 
extend Smith to allow officers to examine a cell phone’s call logs.64 
In that vein, Judge Richard Leon of the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia recently entered an order granting a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the NSA from continuing its ongoing 
bulk collection of metadata in Klayman v. Obama.65  The court found that 
the plaintiff, Larry Klayman, had standing to challenge both the NSA’s 
 
58 Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third Party 
Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 74–75 (2011). 
59 Id. at 74. 
60 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010). 
61 Id. (emphasis added). 
62 See Ghoshray, supra note 58, at 80, 83. 
63 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
64 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–45 (1979)). 
65 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (automatically staying the 
temporary injunction was automatically due to national security concerns pending the 
outcome of appeals), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/JudgeLeonNSAopinion12162013.pdf. 
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collection of metadata, and its analysis thereof in contravention of 
Clapper; the government set forth an argument detailing the “historical 
repository . . . of terrorist-related communications across multiple 
telecommunications networks” and the creation of a “comprehensive 
metadata database.”66 
Judge Leon reasoned that the plaintiffs had a likelihood of success 
on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claims because the FISC’s 
reliance on Smith is misplaced due to the “evolutions in the Government’s 
surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship 
between the NSA and telecom companies,” and that the “surveillance 
program now before [the court] is so different from a simple pen register 
that Smith is of little value.”67  In so holding, the court addressed the 
plurality in Jones, as well as that in Quon, in denoting that an increasing 
dependency on technology for everyday activities creates a greater and 
more reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone use as metadata 
“reflects a wealth of detail about [individuals’] familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”68  Moreover, it is likely 
that the plaintiffs will be able to show that the collection of bulk metadata 
constitutes an unreasonable search because “no court has ever recognized 
a special need sufficient to justify continuous, daily searches of virtually 
every American citizen without any particularized suspicion.”69 
Shortly after the Klayman Order was entered, Judge William Pauley 
entered a diametrically opposed Order in American Civil Liberties Union 
 
66 Id. at 37–38. 
67 Id. at 45, 47 (Additional differences between the scenario of Smith and bulk metadata 
collection include the short term nature of the pen register versus the creation of a database 
containing at least five years worth of historical information, the creation of a formal 
partnership between the NSA and telecoms whereby the latter provide daily rolling updates 
of all metadata moving through the networks, the “almost-Orwellian” technology that allows 
for the storage of such metadata for analysis, and the nature and quantity of individuals’ 
collected metadata differs significantly from that collected in 1979 under the guidance of 
Smith.). 
68 See id. at 52–55 (discussing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring), 962 (Alito, J., concurring)); Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 
2630 (2010). 
69 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 56–58 (citing Nat’l Fed’n Of Emps.-IAM v. Vilsack, 681 
F.3d 483, 488–89 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment absent some quantum of individualized suspicion); Bd. of Educ. 
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–34 (2002) (noting that context specific inquiries can merit 
suspicionless searches upon consideration of the nature of the privacy interests compromised, 
the character of the intrusion, and the nature and immediacy of the governments concerns and 
whether the search will meet them.). 
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(“ACLU”) v. Clapper,70 in the Southern District of New York.  Therein, 
Judge Pauley held that the ACLU was precluded from bringing a 
statutory claim against Section 215 of the Patriot Act.71  More to the point, 
Judge Pauley explicitly disagreed with the Klayman court in holding that 
until the Supreme Court deemed otherwise, the Smith precedent must 
hold and noted that “[t]he collection of breathtaking amounts of 
information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform 
that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search.”72 
Regardless of Judge Pauley’s ruling in ACLU, Judge Leon’s novel 
opinion in Klayman is the first instance of a court even making a 
preliminary finding that the NSA domestic surveillance program is 
unconstitutional.  These opinions are clearly not the final word on the 
matter, and there is little doubt that both will be appealed to the Supreme 
Court.  The timing of such appeals is questionable.  Should the appeals 
take the traditional route, it may be some time before the Supreme Court 
speaks on either case, unless either are accepted on a petition for certiorari 
before judgment.  ACLU v. Clapper was argued before the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeal on September 2, 2014, and Klayman v. Obama had not 
yet been argued.73  As of September 2014, no opinion for either case has 
been issued by the circuit courts. 
 
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES TO MASS DOMESTIC 
SURVEILLANCE 
With the limited efficacy in challenging the NSA’s domestic 
surveillance programs in the courts, it is up to Congress to rein in the 
NSA overreach.  Despite significant concern in the private sector for 
years regarding perceived governmental overreach via NSA surveillance, 
bipartisan congressional support for greater transparency, oversight, and 
reform of the intelligence community did not emerge until Mr. Snowden 
began leaking classified documents exposing the breadth and depth of 
government surveillance.74 
 
70 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
71 Id. at 741 (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)). 
72 Id. at 752.   
73 ACLU v. Clapper—Challenge to NSA Mass Call-Tracking Program, AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-v-clapper-challenge-nsa-
mass-phone-call-tracking (last visited Dec. 16, 2014); Argument Calendar, Courtroom 
1703, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, 
http://ww2.ca2.uscourts.gov/calendar/index.php?eID=380 (last visited Dec. 16, 2014). 
74 Associated Press, House Passes NSA Regulations, First Legislation Since Snowden 
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Prior to the Snowden leaks beginning in May 2013, the extent to 
which Congress was aware of the scope of the NSA’s surveillance 
program was likely limited.  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence received full 
briefings, but other members briefed did not have the benefit of staff 
expertise to analyze the extensive program documentation.75 
There is little doubt that the NSA’s surveillance programs are 
overbroad, and it is collecting far more data than limited targeting would 
suggest.  However, few would argue against the importance of targeted 
collection in a counterterrorism capacity.  Thus, Congress’s first effort at 
addressing the NSA surveillance program may not necessarily have 
stricken an appropriate balance between Fourth Amendment protections 
and counterterrorism intelligence gathering needs, although recent efforts 
have gained more traction. 
 
A.   House Bills and Actions 
i. The Amash-Conyers Amendment 
Congress’s first major effort to address the NSA’s overreach came 
during the Department of Defense Appropriations Act debate via the 
Amash-Conyers Amendment.  The Amendment would have precluded 
funding for any surveillance conducted by the NSA not explicitly falling 
under the purview of 50 U.S.C. §1861, also known as Section 215 of the 
PATRIOT Act, regarding the investigation of a suspected agent of a 
foreign power.76  The Amendment was the subject of heated debate.  
 
Leaks, CBSDC (May 22, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/05/22/house-
passes-nsa-regulations-first-legislation-since-snowden-leaks/. 
75 See Glenn Kessler, Obama’s Claim that ‘Every Member of Congress’ was Briefed on 
Telephone Surveillance, WASH. POST FACT CHECKER (June 11, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamas-claim-that-every-member-
of-congress-was-briefed-on-telephone-surveillance/2013/06/10/fd03ea8e-d21f-11e2-8cbe-
1bcbee06f8f8_blog.html (relaying that Senator Jeff Merkley stated he needed special 
permission to be briefed on the issue, not serving on the Intelligence Committee and 
conveying that Representative Keith Ellison noted tackling the issue in depth required staff 
assistance). 
76 H.R. 2397, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); H. Amend. 100 to H.R. 2397, 113th Cong. § 1 
(2013) (“None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to execute a [FISC] order 
pursuant to section 501 of [FISA] of 1978 (50 U.S.C § 1861) that does not include the 
following sentence:  ‘This Order limits the collection of any tangible things [including 
metadata] that may be authorized to be collected pursuant to this Order to those tangible things 
that pertain to a person who is subject of an investigation described in [50 U.S.C. § 1861]’”) 
(Rep. Justin Amash (R), Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D)).  Section 215 is widely regarded as 
providing the basis through which surveillance overreach occurs by requiring disclosure of 
tangible evidence via an Order specifying that the information sought is part and parcel to an 
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Proponents argued that it would end abuse of Section 215 while allowing 
legitimate investigations to continue.77  Opponents argued that this was 
the wrong vehicle to address the issue.  They argued that the NSA 
program was constitutional because it did not access communication 
content and it was necessary to continue battling terrorism.78 
The Amash-Conyers Amendment came as somewhat of a surprise 
to House members and shredded party lines by bringing together liberal 
Democrats and Tea Party Republicans on both sides of the vote, but 
ultimately failed in a vote of 217–205.79  At the time of the vote, members 
had not yet conducted a full analysis of the issue and likely wanted to 
hold hearings to determine how to best address the NSA programs before 
simply cutting off funding. 
 
ii. The USA FREEDOM Act—Introduced Version 
Representative Jim Sensenbrener, a Republican and the primary 
sponsor of the USA PATRIOT Act, has introduced the comprehensive 
USA FREEDOM Act to counteract the perceived NSA overreach 
occurring through the implementation of Section 215.80  On introduction, 
it had 102 bipartisan cosponsors, and Senator Patrick Leahy’s companion 
bill in the Senate, Senate Bill 1599, has eighteen bipartisan cosponsors.81  
The House of Representatives passed this bill with amendments that are 
 
“authorized investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism.  It is titled “Access to 
certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations,” 
and it provides, in part:  
“(a)(1) The Director of the [FBI] . . . may make an application for an order requiring the 
production of any tangible things . . . for an investigation to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United 
States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first 
amendment to the Constitution. 
(2) An investigation conducted under this section shall –(A) be conducted under guidelines 
approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333.”  50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1)(2). 
77 See 159 CONG. REC. H4981, 5023–25 (statements of Reps. Justin Amash, John 
Conyers, Jr., James Sensenbrenner) (daily ed. July 24, 2013). 
78 Id. at 5024 (statements of Reps. Bill Young, Mike Rogers, and Michelle Bachmann). 
79 Id. at 5028 (tallying the Yea votes that included Rep. Alan Grayson (D) and Rep. Raul 
Labrador; Nay votes included Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D) and Rep. Michelle Bachmann). 
80 See H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/house-
bill/3361/cosponsors?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr+3361%22%5D%7D. 
81 See id.; see also S. 1599, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-
bill/1599/cosponsors?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s+1599%22%5D%7D. 
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discussed in more detail below.82 
The FREEDOM Act takes several steps to enact reforms to the 
PATRIOT and FISA Amendment Acts.  This includes placing stronger 
requirements on obtaining FISC Orders for the production of information 
by removing the presumption of relevance from any request and 
precluding production for mere threat assessments.83  Likewise, it 
prohibits the placement of PR and TT devices by precluding their use for 
threat assessments and by requiring specificity in any request for such 
devices.84  It also places minimization requirements on the use of such 
devices for conducting surveillance by prohibiting the retention or 
dissemination of information collected not pertaining to a target of the 
search; for example, the NSA must enact procedures to discard any 
dragnet information collected not correlated to targeted and approved 
searches.85 
Title III of the Act directly addresses Section 702 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881(a), by prohibiting a search of a collection of communications of a 
“United States person” unless an emergency authorization is granted.86  It 
also limits collecting communications information occurring within the 
United States by limiting such to targeted individuals or those with a 
targeted account identifier.87  It also strengthens, to a lesser degree, 
prohibitions against reverse targeting of United States citizens by setting 
forth that “a significant purpose” of foreign targeting cannot be to obtain 
communications from a United States person.88 
The FREEDOM Act also improves transparency of surveillance in 
several ways.  It requires that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) release 
opinions, in full, redacted, or as summaries, issued by the FISC from 2003 
forward that include a significant construction or interpretation of law 
describing the issue of law and basis of the decision.89  Second, it permits 
telecoms to disclose quarterly estimates of the number of orders received 
 
82 The House passed H.R. 3361 on Roll Call Vote No. 230 by a vote of 303–121.  160 
CONG. REC. H4789, 4789–93 (2014). 
83 H.R. 3361 § 101 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)). 
84 Id. at § 201 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)). 
85 Id. at § 202 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1842). 
86 Id. at § 301 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)). 
87 Id. (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d) & (i)). 
88 H.R. 3361 § 303 (as introduced) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/3361/text/162269?q={%22search%22:[%22hr%203361%22]}. 
89 Id. at § 4 (amending Title IX, § 905). 
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and complied with and the number of accounts affected.90  Last, it requires 
annual disclosure of orders applied for and granted and the number of 
United States persons targeted.91 
The Act, as introduced, proposed the creation of an “Office of the 
Special Advocate” that would act as counsel to entities against which 
Orders to Produce are sought and will represent such entities before the 
FISC.92  This section of the bill would also create a right to appeal FISC 
decisions before a review panel, which would examine the issue under de 
novo review.93 
 
iii. Other House Bills 
A number of smaller bills that address limited aspects of the 
FREEDOM Act have been introduced in the House, but none have the 
extensive and bipartisan support thereto afforded.  One such bill, the 
Surveillance State Repeal (“SSR”) Act, does exactly as its name indicates 
in fully repealing the PATRIOT and 2008 FISA Amendments Acts, 
requiring instead that a probable cause warrant be issued to collect 
information on United States persons and requiring stronger 
whistleblower protections.94  Another bill that has received attention, the 
Intelligence Oversight and Accountability Act, essentially only requires 
greater reporting to Congress on orders before the FISC and affords no 
public transparency.95  A third, the Government Surveillance 
Transparency Act, allows the disclosures sought by technology 
companies by permitting the release of the aggregate number of FISC 
orders with which they were required to comply.96  The Telephone 
Surveillance Accountability Act only increases the standard by which an 
order for a search of telephone metadata is granted from relevance to a 
“reasonable articulable suspicion.”97 
 
 
90 Id. at § 604 (as referred in the Senate) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)) (In H.R. 3361, 
as introduced, the disclosure limitations were set forth in § 601).  
91 Id. at § 602 (as referred in the Senate). 
92 Id. at § 401 (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate and Title IX, “The Office 
of the Special Advocate,” in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885). 
93 Id. (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate).  
94 See H.R. 2818, 113th Cong. (2013). 
95 H.R. 3103, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013). 
96 H.R. 2736, 113th Cong. § 901 (2013). 
97 H.R. 2684, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013). 
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B. Comprehensive Senate Bills and Actions 
A companion bill to the original USA FREEDOM Act was 
introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill 1599, but has since been updated 
by Senator Patrick Leahy as Senate Bill 2685 following passage of the 
Act in the House.98  In addition to the USA FREEDOM Act, Senator Ron 
Wyden and Senator Diane Feinstein have introduced two comprehensive 
bills to address NSA surveillance, the Intelligence Oversight and 
Surveillance Reform Act and the FISA Improvements Act, respectively.99  
Senator Wyden’s bill is substantially similar to the FREEDOM Act with 
some ancillary addendums.  For instance, it provides additional 
protections to ensure that no records obtained extrajudicially from an 
order will be admissible in court.100  It significantly addresses reverse 
targeting of United States persons and requires greater disclosure of FISA 
orders.101  It also addresses the Supreme Court’s holding in ACLU by 
creating a cause of action to challenge government surveillance via a 
reasonable belief that communications will be collected and reasonable 
steps were taken to avoid surveillance.102 
Conversely, Senator Feinstein’s bill, which passed out of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, has been much derided for essentially 
codifying the NSA’s conduct of the past decade.103  While there is a 
section titled “General Prohibition on Bulk Collection,” it actually allows 
for metadata collection upon identifying the facility from which it will be 
collected and using minimization procedures relative to who can utilize 
the records and how, but annual aggregated numbers of investigative 
 
98 S. 2685, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); S. 1599, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013). 
99 S. 1631, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 1551, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013). 
100 S. 1551 §§ 101–02 (amending sections entitled “Privacy Protections for Section 215 
Business Records Orders” and “Emergency Authority for Access to Call Data Records,” 
respectively). 
101 Id. at §§ 302, 406 (amending section entitled “Protections Against Collection of 
Wholly Domestic Communications not Concerning Terrorism under FISA Amendment Act” 
and adding section entitled “Disclosure,” respectively). 
102 Id. at § 305 (amending section entitled “Challenges to Government Surveillance”). 
103 S. REP. NO. 113–119, at 12 (2013); John Hudson & Shane Harris, Diane Feinstein is 
Still a Friend of the NSA, FOREIGN POLICY, (Oct. 31, 2013, 6:21 PM), 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/31/diane_feinstein_is_still_a_friend_of_the
_nsa_after_all; Matt Sledge, Senate Intelligence Committee Passes Bill That Codifies, 
Expands NSA Powers, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2013, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/31/senate-bill-nsa_n_4183183.html; Trevor Timm, 
Sen. Diane Feinstein’s New NSA Bill Will Codify and Extend Mass Surveillance of Americans, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/10/sen-
feinsteins-nsa-bill-will-codify-and-extend-mass-surveillance. 
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leads, warrants, and court orders would be publicly released.104  To a 
degree, it provides for greater congressional oversight by requiring 
semiannual Attorney General reports and an annual Director of National 
Intelligence report on violations of the law or executive order and by 
providing access to all FISC orders to the congressional intelligence 
committees and other members of Congress.105  However, it does not 
provide for additional public transparency.106 
Another piece of the bill limits targeting of foreign nationals 
entering the United States to an additional seventy-two hours, which has 
been subject to abuse.107  Lastly, two improvements to the current 
surveillance regime allow the FISC to appoint amicus counsel to address 
novel issues before it and increase criminal penalties for gaining 
unauthorized access to data collected under the FISA surveillance 
programs.108 
 
i. USA FREEDOM Act 
The updated Senate version, Senate Bill 2685, of the USA 
FREEDOM Act is trimmed down as well and maintains differences with 
the House passed iteration of the Act, House Bill 3361.  Notably, House 
Bill 3361 provides broader leeway in obtaining information and call data 
through the use of specific selection terms.109  Under Senate Bill 2685, 
applying to the FISC for a search requires a factual statement reflecting 
that foreign powers or agents thereto are engaging in “international 
terrorism or activities in preparation therefor,” while House Bill 3361 
only requires a showing that such a search relates to foreign powers.110  
House Bill 3361 specifically references the need to “protect against 
international terrorism,” after defining the necessary showing to grant an 
application, but the Senate’s more exacting language appears to close a 
 
104 S. REP. NO. 113–119 § 2 (discussing section entitled “Supplemental Procedures for 
Acquisitions of Certain Business Records for Counterterrorism Purposes”). 
105 See id. at § 2; S. 1631, 113th Cong. §§ 509, 601–2 (2013) (discussing sections entitled 
“Annual Reports on Violations of Law or Executive Order,” “Semiannual Report of the 
Attorney General,” and “Availability of Reports and Submissions,” respectively). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at § 7 (discussing section entitled “Temporary Targeting of Persons other than 
United States Persons Traveling into the United States”). 
108 Id. at §§ 3–4 (discussing sections entitled “Enhanced Criminal Penalties for 
Unauthorized Access to Collected Data” and “Appointment of Amicus Curiae,” respectively). 
109 Compare S. 2685, 113th Cong. § 101(a) (2014), with H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 101(a) 
(2013) (as referred in the Senate). 
110 Compare S. 2685 § 101(a), with H.R. 3361 § 101(a). 
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loophole that could conceivably be utilized to collect additional 
metadata.111 
Additionally, Senate Bill 2685, in Title I, FISA Business Records 
Reform, creates a more exacting definition in furtherance of minimization 
procedures by including a subsection applying such procedures to 
persons not the subject of authorized investigations or in contact with 
such persons or who are not suspected agents of foreign powers.112  A 
similar section is not contained in the version of House Bill 3361 that was 
passed in the House.113 
The concern regarding overly broad or undefined terms under the 
context of “specific selection term” is somewhat abrogated in Senate Bill 
2685.  Rather than the term “device,” the term “personal device” is 
utilized; this qualifying word presumably creates greater limitations on 
searches to an individual or entity’s cell phone, tablet, or computer.114  
Senate Bill 2685 also focuses on the need to narrowly tailor searches by 
precluding the use of overly broad references to geographical location or 
communications service providers standing alone, which is omitted from 
House Bill 3361.115 
The most notable difference between Senate Bill 2685 and House 
Bill 3361, in the section pertaining to PR and TT devices, is the specific 
inclusion of the stronger definition of “specific selection devices” and the 
definition of “address” as relating to physical and electronic addresses, 
such as an email, temporary network, or internet protocol address.116 
As to FISA acquisitions for persons located outside of the United 
States, Senate Bill 2685 implicitly maintains standing minimization 
requirements, while House Bill 3361 specifically prohibits the 
dissemination of information stemming from persons located in the 
United States.117  However, Senate Bill 2685 cites as applicable 
 
111 Compare S. 2685 § 101(a), with H.R. 3361 § 101(a). 
112 S. 2685 § 103(c) (amending section entitled “Prohibition on Bulk Collection of 
Tangible Things: Minimization Procedures”). 
113 Compare S. 2685 § 103(c), with H.R. 3361 Title I. 
114 Compare S. 2685 § 107 (amending section entitled “Definitions”), with H.R. 3361 § 
107 (as referred in the Senate). 
115 Compare S. 2685 § 107 (amending section entitled “Definitions”), with H.R. 3361 § 
107 (as referred in the Senate). 
116 S. 2685 § 201 (amending section entitled “Prohibition on Bulk Collection”). 
117 Compare S. 2685 § 301 (amending section entitled “Limits on Use of Unlawfully 
Obtained Information”), with H.R. 3361 § 301 (amending section entitled “Clarification on 
Prohibition on Searching of Collections of Communications to Conduct Warrantless Searches 
for the Communications of United States Persons”). 
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minimization procedures precluding the dissemination of non-public 
information regarding non-consenting United States person.118 
Senate Bill 2685 also declines to create an Office of the Special 
Advocate, whose role would be to advocate for privacy issues.119  
However, like the passed version of House Bill 3361, it provides for amici 
to work with the FISC in analyzing applications and applying the law to 
same.120  A further substantial difference is that Senate Bill 2685 requires 
the courts to appoint a panel of amici and provides explicit detail for their 
role in advocating before the court, including their ability to obtain 
independent technical experts to assist in their analysis of the issues.121 
With regard to transparency in declassifying decisions, orders, and 
opinions of the FISC, Senate Bill 2685 and House Bill 3361 are identical, 
as outlined in the discussion of House Bill 3361, above.122  Other 
transparency provisions have differing requirements, such as Senate Bill 
2685’s insistence that governmental reports be published on the 
Internet.123  Senate Bill 2685 also requires greater specificity with respect 
to the information disclosed in such governmental reports, including the 
number of persons whose communications were collected and those who 
are believed to be located in the United States.124  Likewise, Senate Bill 
2685 provides slightly more specificity than House Bill 3361 relative to 
disclosures permitted by entities toward which FISC orders and national 
security letters are directed; other than the Senate provision prohibiting 
the disclosure of orders affecting new services or platforms for 540 days, 
the iterations are substantially similar.125  Lastly, Senate Bill 2685 places 
 
118 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4) (2012). 
119 Compare S. 2685 § 401 (discussing the appointment of amicus curiae), with H.R. 3361 
§ 401 (as referred in the Senate) (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate). 
120 Compare S. 2685 § 401 (discussing the appointment of amicus curiae), with H.R. 3361 
§ 401 (as referred in the Senate) (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate). 
121 Compare S. 2685 § 401 (discussing the appointment of amicus curiae), with H.R. 3361 
§ 401 (as referred in the Senate) (establishing the Office of the Special Advocate). 
122 Compare S. 2685 § 402 (amending section entitled “Declassification of Decisions, 
Orders, and Opinions”), with H.R. 3361 § 402 (as referred in the Senate) (amending section 
entitled “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Disclosure of Opinions”), and S. 2685 § 
101(a), with H.R. 3361 § 101(a). 
123 S. 2685 §§ 602–03 (amending sections entitled “Annual Reports by the Government” 
and “Public Reporting by Persons Subject to FISA Orders,” respectively). 
124 Compare S. 2685 § 602 (amending section entitled “Annual Reports by the 
Government”), with H.R. 3361 § 603 (as referred in the Senate) (amending section entitled 
“Annual Reports by the Government on Orders Entered”). 
125 Compare S. 2685 § 603 (amending section entitled “Public Reporting by Persons 
Subject to FISA Orders”), with H.R. 3361 § 604 (as referred in the Senate) (amending section 
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limitations on the disclosure of national security letters if such would 
result in national security risks, interference with diplomatic relations, 
interference with investigations, or danger to the life and safety of any 
person.126 
 
ii. Other Senate Bills 
As in the House, several smaller bills have been introduced in the 
Senate, including the Ending Secret Law (“ESL”) Act, the Surveillance 
Transparency Act (“STA”), the Freedoms and Privacy Act (“FPA”), and 
Senate Bill 1182, to amend FISA regarding evidence necessary to access 
business records.127  Again, these bills occur in piecemeal rather than 
comprehensive fashion, but include some interesting provisions worth 
considering. 
The ESL Act requires the disclosure of all FISC orders that involve 
interpretation of FISA subject to national security concerns, and if an 
order cannot be declassified under that basis, a summary of each decision 
must be released.128  Senate Bill 1182 parallels the FREEDOM Act in 
setting forth stricter requirements by creating a factual basis upon which 
orders of production for documents and metadata can be sought.129 
The STA seeks to expand government reporting requirements under 
NSA surveillance programs by requiring the Attorney General to submit 
an annual unclassified report that reflects: the total number of 
applications to the FISC for orders for production and for PR/TT use; the 
number of orders granted, modified, or denied; and good faith estimates 
for the number of individuals whose electronic information was collected 
through the NSA surveillance programs.130  It also allows telecoms to 
issue biannual reports reflecting the number of orders received and 
complied with and the number of people whose information was collected 
pursuant to the orders.131 
 
entitled “Public Reporting by Persons Subject to Orders”). 
126 S. 2685 § 502 (amending section entitled “Limitations on Disclosure of National 
Security Letters”). 
127 S. 1701, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 1452, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 1182, 113th 
Cong. § 1 (2013); S. 1130, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013). 
128 S. 1130 § 4 (amending section entitled “Requirement for Disclosure of Decisions, 
Orders, and Opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court”). 
129 S. 1182 § 1 (amending section entitled “Specific Evidence for Court Orders to Produce 
Records and Other Items in Intelligence Investigations”). 
130 S. 1452 § 2 (amending section entitled “Enhanced Public Reporting for Orders under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978”). 
131 Id. at § 3 (amending section entitled “Public Disclosures of Aggregate Information 
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The FPA amends FISA to allow individuals being federally 
prosecuted based on evidence garnered from NSA surveillance programs 
to seek discovery of the applications to, and orders for production or for 
PR and TT devices entered by, the FISC.132  It also requires written 
certification by the Attorney General to use such evidence in criminal 
proceedings or to share the information within the law enforcement 
community and that these certifications must aggregate and summarize 
the incidences of utilizing the information in investigations or criminal 
proceedings in biannual reports to Congress.133 
 
VI. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE BILLS AND POTENTIAL 
RESOLUTIONS 
It goes without saying that the standalone bills addressing only small 
portions of the NSA surveillance regime will not alone address the 
overreach concerns prevalent among the public, corporations, and 
Congress itself.  Even taken together, they do not meet the level of 
institutional reform necessary to adequately address what is occurring.  
Senator Feinstein’s proposal also does not sufficiently address concerns 
about the NSA’s surveillance programs; rather, it appears to codify the 
NSA’s ongoing activities, as it provides for additional oversight rather 
than reform as she believes that “[t]he NSA call-records program is legal 
and subject to extensive congressional and judicial oversight.”134 
As such, the USA FREEDOM Act stands alone as actually 
providing comprehensive reform, while also being politically palatable 
by allowing for possible bipartisan passage.  Certainly, both the passed 
version of House Bill 3361 and the updated Senate Bill 2685 of the Act 
are not as strong as they were upon initial introduction, but they are still 
more comprehensive than the piecemeal bills.  The more recent Senate 
version of Senate Bill 2685 is not a significantly far cry from the original 
iteration of the Act, save for the elimination of the Office of the Special 
Advocate, which could potentially create legal and constitutional 
issues.135  Key improvements to the current regime include greater 
 
Related to Orders Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978”). 
132 S. 1701 § 2 (amending section entitled “Oversight and Disclosure Procedures of FISA 
Intelligence in Federal Proceedings”). 
133 Id. at § 602 (amending section entitled “Reports to Congress on Intelligence 
Community and Law Enforcement Collaboration”). 
134 See Sledge, supra note 103. 
135 See ANDREW NOLAN, RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, & VIVIAN CHU, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R43260, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: 
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transparency, through improved disclosure protocols that allow public 
acknowledgement of the number of orders for production entered against 
telecoms and the number of people affected, increased oversight by 
Congress through greater reporting requirements, and most importantly, 
creation of a process to allow for the appointment of amicus curiae who 
have expertise in privacy and civil liberties issues, intelligence collection, 
telecommunications, or other relevant fields to assist the FISC; all of 
which have generally received broad support.136  The section providing 
for an Office of the Public Advocate has been removed from the House 
and Senate bills and replaced with the provision allowing for amicus 
curiae, potentially due to the constitutional and practical implications that 
maintaining a standing Special Advocate would entail.137 
The FREEDOM Act is not without fault and could be strengthened 
by amending it to include some of the provisions of the piecemeal bills.  
For example, civil liberties advocates may feel that the FREEDOM Act 
does not strengthen minimization requirements to sufficiently address 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s ruling that PR and TT devices need not require 
specific identification of the target, thus permitting dragnet collection of 
 
INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE (Mar. 21, 2014) (The public advocate can potentially be 
viewed as an agent of the government and may act as a principal or inferior officer of the 
United States.  The public advocate would be subject to the Article II Appointments Clause 
mandates.  Under Article III, it is questionable whether such an advocate has standing to argue 
the “case” or “controversy” before the FISC due to the requirement that they have been 
injured, are threated to suffer injury by putatively illegal conduct, or are authorized to 
represent such an injured party.  Likewise, Article III generally prohibits the government from 
litigating against itself, and allowing the advocate to seek relief on national security issues 
could invade core executive branch powers.  Last, as the advocate would not be a party or 
representative of a party, they may not have standing to appeal FISC orders.); see also 
ANDREW NOLAN, RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, & VIVIAN CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OCT. 
25, INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT’S 
COURTS: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES (2013); cf. Marty Lederman & Steve Vladick, The 
Constitutionality of a FISA “Special Advocate,” JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM), 
http://justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/ (arguing that Appointments 
Clause arguments may be rendered moot if the position were not permanent and the advocate 
was selected on a case-by-case basis, and even if they were a government employee, they 
would not exercise significant government authority, and thus not fall under Appointments 
Clause requirements.  Likewise, the standing issue would be abrogated with properly drafted 
legislation by precluding the advocate from being a party to the case, but merely having a 
lawyer present, possibly for third parties whose metadata and communications are at issue.  
As to appeals, they propose legislation denoting the advocate in a role akin to a guardian ad 
litem, so that they could be representative of absent third parties). 
136 See generally S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2014). 
137 H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 401 (2014); S. 2685 § 401. 
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metadata.138  This could be strengthened by including the portion of the 
SSR Act that requires a warrant for domestic surveillance.139 
It is feasible that the FREEDOM Act could also incorporate some of 
Senator Feinstein’s oversight provisions, such as allowing all members 
of Congress access to adequately redacted FISC orders.140  However, there 
is still the issue of being able to provide full and adequate oversight of 
the program, without which runs the risk that the NSA could again run 
roughshod over Congress.  The current system stymies oversight by only 
permitting members of Congress access to the classified information 
under which the NSA programs operate, disallowing them expert analysis 
of their own staffs and instead requiring reliance on the information 
provided by intelligence agencies in briefings, as the members do not 
have the time to review thousands of documents to make fully informed 
decisions on the subject.141 
Even if the FISC transparency provisions permitting disclosure of 
orders are enacted, the FREEDOM Act still may not prove sufficient to 
allow for full and adequate congressional oversight.  To that end, it would 
be worth considering creating a non-partisan Standing Joint Committee 
on Intelligence Oversight, akin to the Joint Committee on Taxation, that 
would be staffed by experts in national security and constitutional law 
issues.  This committee staff would have the security clearance necessary 
to review the conduct of the NSA and any other involved agencies, 
outside of the auspices of the agency Inspectors General offices and the 
DOJ, so as to be able to provide clear guidance to Congress on the 
efficacy of reform and to ensure that the surveillance activities 
undertaken fall within constitutional confines and the enacted statutory 
regimes.142 
 
138 See FISC Opinion, supra note 32, at 23 (“The Court recognizes that by concluding 
that these definitions do not restrict the use of [PR] and [TT] devices to communication 
facilities associated with individual users, it is finding that these definitions encompass an 
exceptionally broad form of collection.”). 
139 See H.R. 2818, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013). 
140 S. 1631, 113th Cong. § 5 (2013) (amending section entitled “Availability of Reports 
and Submissions”). 
141 See Kessler, supra note 75 (describing that Rep. Ellison noted that the voluminous 
nature of the documents available required expert and staff assistance to review). 
142 It has been proposed that a Select Committee be established to investigate whether 
unconstitutional surveillance has occurred and whether officials acted improperly in doing so.  
However, this seems a temporary fix, which may dissolve into the realm of the political, rather 
than a long term option to adequately supervise this aspect of the intelligence community.  
See H. Res. 350, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013). 
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Other issues that the FREEDOM Act does not address include 
creating a cause of action for individuals and entities actually harmed by 
NSA surveillance and the appearance of NSA meddling in NIST 
encryption creation and gaining unauthorized access to overseas servers.  
The first issue will likely not be resolved for a variety of reasons, 
including that this would potentially make the government liable for an 
untold number of alleged Fourth Amendment infringements, and the real 
world eventuality that such liability would create an undue burden on the 
courts from the thousands of individual claims or class action claims that 
could seek to draw millions of citizens into the class that would 
immediately commence. 
None of the proposed legislation addresses the issue of NSA/NIST 
collaboration in creating backdoors to encryption systems.  Additional 
congressional oversight could address the issue, but to address it at the 
outset and staunch the financial harm befalling the United States tech 
industry, the most readily available way to address the issue, would be 
the budgetary mechanism of defunding the SIGINT Enabling Project.  
This would limit the NSA’s ability to strong-arm NIST and major 
telecoms and reinstill public trust in the tech industry.143 
Regardless of the potential for reform and transparency inherent in 
the FREEDOM Act, it still must overcome the major hurdle of being 
passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by the President.  
Given the nature of the amendments made to the House passed version 
of the Act, it is unlikely that any Senate version of the bill will be 
strengthened by the provisions denoted above.  Rather, even in its 
amended form, it may yet face roadblocks due to Senator Feinstein’s 
competing bill, which received strong bipartisan support in the 
Intelligence Committee.  Should the Senate pass the bill substantially 
unamended from its present form, it could still stall when returned to the 
House for passage or in Conference.  As of September 2014, there were 
merely seven legislative calendar weeks left in the year, four of which are 
considered “lame duck” due to their occurrence after the mid-term 
elections. 
 
 
 
143 Nicole Gaouette, NSA Spying Risks $35 Billion in U.S. Technology Sales, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 26, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-26/nsa-spying-risks-
35-billion-in-u-s-technology-sales.html. 
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VII. PREEMPTIVE PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 
An additional aspect of NSA surveillance reform that must be 
considered is the release of the Report and Recommendations of the 
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technology.144  The Review Group issued a lengthy report stressing the 
need to maintain the public trust that has been damaged resulting from 
the Snowden disclosures and setting forth a list of forty-six reform 
recommendations.145 
Many of these reform recommendations closely parallel the reform 
provisions set forth in the FREEDOM Act, including, but not limited to: 
requiring that the disclosure of metadata from third parties pursuant to 
FISC Order or National Security Letter be narrower in scope than 
currently provided for; permitting telecoms to release generic 
information pertaining to the number of orders received, complied with, 
and the scope of information produced; purging collected information on 
United States persons if collected through surveillance of foreign persons 
unless it has “foreign intelligence value or is necessary to prevent serious 
harm to others;” and creating the position of Public Interest Advocate to 
represent privacy and civil liberties interests before the FISC.146  Other 
recommendations permit for the continued collection and storage of 
metadata by the telecoms themselves, or third parties, not the 
government, and for only limited government access to such 
information.147  Still others would further limit executive power, already 
imperiled by the push toward bringing the administration and the NSA 
under greater congressional oversight, including making the Director of 
the National Security Agency subject to Senate confirmation, permitting 
that the Director be a civilian, and disallowing the Director from also 
being in charge of United States Cyber Command, a military unit.148 
On January 17, 2014, the President announced that he would take 
efforts to implement reforms to foreign intelligence surveillance 
activities prior to March 28, 2014, the date of renewal for the law 
 
144 RICHARD A. CLARK, ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/19/us/politics/19nsa-review.html?_r=0 
[hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL REPORT]. 
145 Id. at 17–18, 24–42. 
146 Id. at 24, 28–29, 36 (discussing recommendations 1, 2, 12, 28). 
147 Id. at 17. 
148 Id. at 34, 210 (discussing recommendations 22–24). 
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authorizing metadata collection.149  This includes three primary actions: 
decreasing the numbers of “hops” from a source phone number from 
which data can be collected; permitting that metadata be held by third 
parties rather than the government allowing access only through FISC 
approval; and creating the post of the public interest advocate.150  A crucial 
aspect of these changes was the recommendation reducing the number of 
“hops” from a source phone number from three to two.151  Procedural 
changes implemented include the requirement that the FISC approve 
queries of telephony metadata on a case-by-case basis and precluding the 
government from storing bulk metadata, placing the onus on the 
telephone companies to maintain the records only as they would in the 
ordinary course of business.152  The public interest advocate position was 
not created, likely due to the constitutional and practical challenges to the 
implementation of such a position in such a short period of time, as 
outlined above.153  Ultimately, the President’s acts were limited in scope, 
and the amendments to the House’s passed version of the USA 
FREEDOM Act align with the implemented changes in part. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
To paraphrase the common understanding of Benjamin Franklin’s 
quote, those who would give up an essential liberty for safety deserve 
neither liberty nor safety.154  However, it seems we have already crossed 
 
149 Fred Kaplan, Pretty Good Privacy: The Three Ambitious NSA Reforms Endorsed by 
Obama, and the One he Rejected, SLATE (Jan. 17, 2014, 4:01 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/01/obama_s_nsa_reform
s_the_president_s_proposals_for_metadata_and_the_fisa.html. 
150 Id. (A “hop” being a colloquial term indicating connections between phone numbers, 
i.e. one hop is the direct connection between the targeted phone number and all phone 
numbers it called, or received calls from.  The second hop is the connection between the 
second tier of phone numbers and all phone number they called and received calls from.  The 
third hop follows suit, bringing the potential amount of acquired metadata into the thousands 
or tens of thousands of phone numbers from a single target.). 
151 H.R Rep. No. 113–452, 14 (2014). 
152 Id. 
153 Ellen Nakashima, Surveillance-court Judges Oppose White House Group’s NSA 
Proposals, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/surveillance-court-judges-oppose-white-house-groups-nsa-
proposals/2014/01/14/3c41e1e2-7d60-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html; see NOLAN ET 
AL., supra note 135. 
154 See Benjamin Wittes, Would Benjamin Franklin Trade Liberty for Wiretapping?, THE 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, (June 12, 2013 8:57 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-
front/posts/2013/06/11-ben-franklin-liberty-wiretapping-security; see also Benjamin Wittes, 
Against a Crude Balance: Platform Security and the Hostile Symbiosis Between Liberty and 
OMBRES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/22/2015  10:30 AM 
56 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
that Rubicon as a nation.  The American public shares immeasurable 
amounts of information, both knowingly and unknowingly, with each 
other; corporations; and now the government, through our everyday acts 
on social media, online purchasing, and use of cell phones.  We have 
reached a point where the public has few qualms with this proposition, 
save for the overreach of the government in collecting metadata on all 
communications, not including their content.  Most Americans, too, are 
likely torn by the collections of communications metadata impinging on 
their privacy and the necessity to conduct global surveillance on 
increasingly tech savvy terrorist groups to prevent future attacks on 
American soil.  This concern is highlighted by the discovery of 
westerners, including persons from the United States, attempting to join 
ranks with extremist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.155 
While it would be wonderful to return to the FISA scheme in place 
pre-9/11, that is no longer feasible from a technological, national security, 
sociopolitical, or even infrastructure-based standpoint, given current 
geopolitics, international terrorist threats, and the billions invested in 
surveillance and data storage infrastructure.  As such, we appear to be 
relegated to imperfect reforms, the best of these being the USA 
FREEDOM legislation, which could still further be strengthened by 
amending it to include portions of the bills noted above and by creating a 
non-partisan joint committee within Congress, although the potential for 
the latter has not garnered much support.156 
Although President Obama has taken action to reform the NSA’s 
collection of domestic communication data, the FREEDOM Act should 
be enacted, regardless of any redundancies with administration policy.  
The Act will aid in providing greater transparency and oversight to the 
NSA surveillance programs currently in place and stem perceived 
violations of the Fourth Amendment.157 
 
Security, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Sept. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/09/21-platform-security-wittes (the author 
argues that the quote is now routinely taken out of context and refers not to civil liberties, but 
to the “right of self-governance of a legislature in the interests of collective security”). 
155 Michael S. Schmidt and Erick Schmitt, U.S. Identifies Citizens Joining Rebels in 
Syria, Including ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/middleeast/us-identifies-citizens-joining-rebels-
in-syria.html?_r=0. 
156 Representative Rokita’s House Resolution 350 garnered only three cosponsors.  H. 
Res. 350, 113th Cong. (2013). 
157 The USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, failed on a cloture vote by a vote of 58–42 in 
favor of cloture on November 18, 2014.  The Library of Congress, S. 2685 – USA FREEDOM 
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Further, it has yet to be determined whether the mass collection of 
metadata actually violates the Fourth Amendment, given the opposite 
holdings of Klayman and ACLU v. Clapper.  If the courts ultimately come 
down on the side of Klayman and civil libertarians, they may well follow 
Judge Leon’s insight into evolving legal theory as it pertains to the Third 
Party Doctrine and Smith v. Maryland, as discussed above. 
Since the Supreme Court, and no federal circuit court, has 
overturned Smith, Judge Leon’s ruling that NSA surveillance violates the 
Fourth Amendment may not withstand initial appellate consideration on 
the basis of stare decisis.  However, regardless of the outcome in the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court, the Supreme Court may well grant 
certiorari, and the Court will ultimately speak to the issue of whether 
mass NSA data collection is unconstitutional.  Even absent taking up the 
Klayman case, the Court will, at a minimum, likely take up a similar issue 
in the context of whether there is a privacy expectation in protecting cell 
site location information generated when cell phones are used to prevent 
the government from being able access this information without a warrant 
due to a split between the circuit courts on the issue.158 
To that end, the Court may help address these issues by adopting 
something akin to Professor Stephen Henderson’s four-part test to 
determine whether Fourth Amendment privacy protections should apply 
to an individual, which, to a degree, coincides with the concerns 
expressed via the USA FREEDOM Act and the recommendations of the 
President’s review panel.  The test includes whether: 
(1) The initial transfer of the information from the person to a third 
party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society or is 
socially beneficial, including to freedom of speech and association; 
(2) The information is personal, including the extent to which it is 
intimate and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and 
whether outside of the initial transfer to a third party it is typically 
disclosed only within one’s close social network, if at all; 
 
Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV. https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-
bill/2685?q={%22search%22%3A[%22\%22Usa+freedom\%22%22]} (last visited Dec. 29, 
2014); U.S. SENATE, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 2nd Session, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113
&session=2&vote=00282 (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
158 See In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that no warrants are required to obtain cell site data); cf. In re United States for an 
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 
F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding the government is required to show probable cause to obtain 
a warrant to gain access to cell site location information). 
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(3) The information is accessible to and accessed by nongovernment 
persons outside the institution; and 
(4) Existing law restricts or allows access to and dissemination of 
the information or similar information.159 
Until the courts begin addressing these privacy concerns, enactment 
of the FREEDOM Act will be a strong first step toward reform and 
transparency.  However, if NSA overreach continues, there may be 
renewed and more vociferous calls to pursue the remedies suggested by 
Representative Holt, repealing the PATRIOT Act and the FISA 
Amendments Act, and starting anew. 
Of course, this is neither practically nor politically feasible, and it 
must be questioned whether such would put the nation in a precarious 
national security scenario akin to that in place prior to 9/11, considering 
the growth of international terroristic activities.  It is not a far reach to say 
that regardless of safeguards enacted by and oversight provided by 
Congress, as technological advances accelerate and now that the 
electronic surveillance infrastructure has been built, it will not be going 
away anytime soon.  Accordingly, Congress and the American public 
must remain vigilant to strike a balance ensuring both that the nation’s 
security is provided for and that the Fourth Amendment is not buried 
under the “need for security.” 
 
 
159 Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party 
Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 50–51 (2011). 
